CHAPTER 4

"The Uncanny" (1919)

Sigmund Freud

The German word unheimlich is obviously the opposite of heimlich, heimisch, meaning "familiar"; "native," "belonging to the home"; and we are tempted to conclude that what is "uncanny" is frightening precisely because it is not known and familiar. Naturally not everything which is new and unfamiliar is frightening, we conclude that what is "uncanny" is frightening precisely because it is meaning "familiar"; "native," "belonging to the home"; and we are tempted to by any means all. Something has to be added to what is novel and unfamiliar to make it uncanny.

On the whole, Jentsch did not get beyond this relation of the uncanny to the novel and unfamiliar. He ascribes the essential factor in the production of the feeling of uncanniness to intellectual uncertainty; so that the uncanny would always be that in which one does not know where one is, as it were. The better orientated in his environment a person is, the less readily will he get the impression of something uncanny in regard to the objects and events in it.

It is not difficult to see that this definition is incomplete, and we will therefore try to proceed beyond the equation of unheimlich with unfamiliar. We will first turn to other languages. But foreign dictionaries tell us nothing new, perhaps only something to conceal; something to conceal; to sigh or weep; (of a house) haunted; (of a man) a repulsive fellow.

I wish to express my indebtedness to Dr. Th. Reik for the following excerpts:


GREEK: (Rost's and Schenkl's Lexikons). Evos — strange, foreign.

ENGLISH: (from dictionaries by Lucas, Bellow, Flugel, Muret: Sanders). Uncomfortable, uneasy, gloomy, dismal, uncanny, ghastly; (of a house) haunted; (of a man) a repulsive fellow.

FRENCH: (Sachs—Villatte). Inquiétant, sinistre, lugubre, mal à son aise.

SPANISH: (Tollhausen, 1889). Sospechoso, de mal agüero, lugubre, siniestro.

The Italian and the Portuguese seem to content themselves with words which we should describe as circumlocutions. In Arabic and Hebrew "uncanny" means the same as "daemonic," "gruesome."

Let us therefore return to the German language. In Daniel Sanders' Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache (1860), the following remarks [abstracted in translation] are found upon the word heimlich: I have laid stress on certain passages by italicizing them.

Heimlich adj.: 1. Also heimlich, heimelig, belonging to the house, not strange, familiar, tame, intimate, comfortable, homely, etc.

(a) (Obsolete) belonging to the house or the family, or regarded as so belonging (cf. Latin familiaris). Die Heimlichen, the members of the household; Der heimliche Rat [him to whom secrets are revealed] Gen. xli. 45; 2 Sam. xxi. 23; now more usually Geheimer Rat [Privy Councilor], cf. Heimlicher.

(b) Of animals: tame, companionable to man. As opposed to wild, e.g. "Wild animals ... that are trained to be heimlich and accustomed to men." "If these young creatures are brought up from early days among men they become quite heimlich, friendly," etc.

(c) Friendly, intimate, homely; the enjoyment of quiet content, etc., arousing a sense of peaceful pleasure and security as in one within the four walls of his house. "It is still heimlich to you in your country where strangers are felling your woods?" "She did not feel all too heimlich with him." "To destroy the Heimlichkeit of the home." "I could not readily find another spot so intimate and heimlich as this." "In quiet Heimlichkeit, surrounded by close walls." "A careful housewife, who knows how to make a pleasing Heimlichkeit (Hauslichkeit)4 out of the smallest means." "The protestant rulers do not feel ... Heimlich among their catholic subjects." "When it grows heimlich and still, and the evening quiet alone watches over your cell." "Quiet, lovely and heimlich, no place more fitted for her rest." "The in and outflowing waves of the current, dreamy and heimlich as a cradle-song." Cf. in especial Unheimlich.

Among Swabian and Swiss authors in especial, often as a trisyllable: "How heimlich it seemed again of an evening, back at home." "The warm room and the heimelig afternoon." "Little by little they grew at ease and heimelig among themselves." "That which comes from afar ... assuredly does not live quite heimelig (heimatisch) [at home], freundlichlich [in a neighborly way] among the people." "The sentinel's horn sounds so heimelig from the tower, and his voice invites so hospitably." This form of the word ought to become general in order to protect the word from becoming obsolete in its good sense through an easy confusion with Heimlichkeit. [see below]. "The Zechs [a family name] are all heimlich." "Heimlich? What do you understand by 'heimlich'?" "Well, ... they are like a buried spring or a dried-up pond. One cannot walk over it without always having the feeling that water might come up there again." "Oh, call it 'heimlich'; you call it 'heimlich'. Well, what makes you think that there is something secret and untrustworthy about this family?" Gutzkow.

II. Concealed, kept from sight, so that others do not get to know about it, withheld from others, cf. geheim [secret]; so also Heimlichkeit für Gehörniss [secret]. To do something heimlich, i.e. behind someone's back; to steal away heimlich; heimlich meetings and appointments; to look on with heimlich pleasure at someone's discomfiture; to sigh or weep heimlich; to behave heimlich, as though there was something to conceal; heimlich love, love-affair, sin; heimlich places (which good manners oblige us to conceal). 1 Sam. v. 6; "The heimlich chamber" [privy]. 2. Kings
What interests us most in this long extract is to find that among its different shades of meaning the word heimlich exhibits one which is identical with its opposite, unheimlich. What is heimlich thus comes to be unheimlich. (Cf. the quotation from Gutzkow: "We call it unheimlich; you call it heimlich.") In general we are reminded that the word heimlich is not unambiguous, but belongs to two sets of ideas, which without being contradictory are yet very different: on the one hand, it means that which is obscure, inaccessible to knowledge "Do you not see? They do not trust us; they fear the heimlich face of the Duke of Friedland." (Schiller, Wallenstein's Lager, Scene 2.)

Thus heimlich is a word the meaning of which develops in the direction of ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its opposite, unheimlich. Unheimlich is in some way or other a sub-species of heimlich. Let us bear this discovery in mind, though we cannot yet rightly understand it, alongside of Schelling's definition of the Unheimlich. If we go on to examine individual instances of uncaniness, these hints will become intelligible to us.

II

When we proceed to review the things, persons, impressions, events and situations which are able to arouse in us a feeling of the uncanny in a particularly forcible and definite form, the first requirement is obviously to select a suitable example to start on. Jentsch has taken as a very good instance "doubts whether an apparently animate being is really alive; or conversely, whether a lifeless object might not be in fact animate"; and he refers in this connection to the impression made by waxwork figures, ingeniously constructed dolls and automata. To these he adds the uncanny effect of epileptic fits, and of manifestations of insanity, because these excite in the spectator the impression of automatic, mechanical processes at work behind the ordinary appearance of mental activity. Without entirely accepting this author's view, we will take it as a starting-point for our own investigation because in what follows he reminds us of a writer who has succeeded in producing uncanny effects better than anyone else.

Jentsch writes: "In telling a story, one of the most successful devices for easily creating uncanny effects is to leave the reader in uncertainty whether a particular

... (Schiller, Wilhelm Tell, I, 4.). ... Poetic licence, rarely so used in modern speech.

Heimlich is used in conjunction with a verb expressing the act of concealing: "In the secret of his tabernacle he shall hide me heimlich." (Ps. xxvii. 5.) ... Heimlich parts of the human body, pudenda ... "the men that died not were smitten on their heimlich parts." (1. Samuel v. 12.) ...
figure in the story is a human being or an automaton, and to do it in such a way that his attention is not focused directly upon his uncertainty, so that he may not be led to go into the matter and clear it up immediately. That, as we have said, would quickly dissipate the peculiar emotional effect of the thing. E. T. A. Hoffmann has repeatedly employed this psychological artifice with success in his fantastic narratives.

This observation, undoubtedly a correct one, refers primarily to the story of "The Sand-Man" in Hoffmann's *Nachtwälder,* which contains the original of Olympia, the doll that appears in the first act of Offenbach's opera, *Tales of Hoffmann.* But I cannot think—and I hope most readers of the story will agree with me—that the theme of the doll Olympia, who is to all appearances a living being, is by any means the only, or indeed the most important, element that must be held responsible for the quite unparalleled atmosphere of uncanniness evoked by the story. Nor is this atmosphere heightened by the fact that the author himself treats the episode of Olympia with a faint touch of satire and uses it to poke fun at the young man's idealization of his mistress. The main theme of the story is, on the contrary, something different, something which gives it its name, and which is always re-introduced at critical moments: it is the theme of the "Sand-Man" who tears out children's eyes.

This fantastic tale opens with the childhood recollections of the student Nathaniel. In spite of his present happiness, he cannot banish the memories associated with the mysterious and terrifying death of his beloved father. On certain evenings his mother used to send the children to bed early, warning them that "the Sand-Man was coming"; and, sure enough, Nathaniel would not fail to hear the heavy tread of a visitor, with whom his father would then be occupied for the evening. When questioned about the Sand-Man, his mother, it is true, denied that such a person existed except as a figure of speech; but his nurse could give him more definite information: "He's a wicked man who comes when children won't go to bed, and throws handfuls of sand in their eyes so that they jump out of their heads all bleeding. Then he puts the eyes in a sack and carries them off to the half-moon to feed his children. They sit up there in their nest, and their beaks are hooked like owls' beaks, and they use them to peck up naughty boys' and girls' eyes with."

Although little Nathaniel was sensible and old enough not to credit the figure of the Sand-Man with such gruesome attributes, yet the dread of him became fixed in his heart. He determined to find out what the Sand-Man looked like; and one evening, when the Sand-Man was expected, he hid in his father's study. He recognized the visitor as the lawyer Coppelius, a repellent person whom the children were frightened of when he occasionally came to a meal; and he now identified this Coppelius with the dreamed Sand-Man. As regards the rest of the scene, Hoffmann already leaves us in doubt whether what we are witnessing is the first delirium of the panic-stricken boy, or a succession of events which are to be regarded in the story as being real. His father and the guest are at work at a brazier with glowing flames. The little eavesdropper hears Coppelius call out: "Eyes here! Eyes here!" and betrays himself by screaming aloud. Coppelius seizes him and is on the point of dropping bits of red-hot coal from the fire into his eyes, and then of throwing them into the brazier, but his father begs him off and saves his eyes. After this the boy falls into a deep swoon; and a long illness brings his experience to an end. Those who decide in favour of the rationalistic interpretation of the Sand-Man will not fail to recognize in the child's phantasy the persisting influence of his nurse's story. The bits of sand that are to be thrown into the child's eyes turn into bits of red-hot coal from the flames; and in both cases they are intended to make his eyes jump out. In the course of another visit of the Sand-Man's, a year later, his father is killed in his study by an explosion. The lawyer Coppelius disappears from the place without leaving a trace behind.

Nathaniel, now a student, believes that he has recognized this phantom of horror from his childhood in an itinerant optician, an Italian called Giuseppe Coppola, who at his university town, offers him weather-glasses for sale. When Nathaniel refuses, the man goes on: "Not weather-glasses? not weather-glasses? also got fine eyes, fine eyes!" The student's terror is allayed when he finds that the proffered eyes are only harmless spectacles, and he buys a pocket spy-glass from Coppola. With its aid he looks across into Professor Spalanzani's house opposite and there spies Spalanzani's beautiful, but strangely silent and motionless daughter, Olympia. He soon falls in love with her so violently that, because of her, he quite forgets the clever and sensible girl to whom he is betrothed. But Olympia is an automaton whose clockwork has been made by Spalanzani, and whose eyes have been put in by Coppola, the Sand-Man. The student surprises the two Masters quarrelling over their handicraft. The optician carries off the wooden eyeless doll; and the mechanician, Spalanzani, picks up Olympia's bleeding eyes from the ground and throws them at Nathaniel's breast, saying that Coppola had stolen them from the student. Nathaniel succumbs to a fresh attack of madness, and in his delirium his recollection of his father's death is mingled with this new experience. "Hurry up! hurry up! ring of fire!" he cries. "Spin about, ring of fire—Hurrah! Hurry up, wooden doll! lovely wooden doll, spin about—." He then falls upon the professor, Olympia's "father," and tries to strangle him.

Rallying from a long and serious illness, Nathaniel seems at last to have recovered. He intends to marry his betrothed, with whom he has become reconciled. One day he and she are walking through the city market-place, over which the high tower of the Town Hall throws its huge shadow. On the girl's suggestion, they climb the tower, leaving her brother, who is walking with them, down below. From the top, Clara's attention is drawn to a curious object moving along the street. Nathaniel looks at this thing through Coppola's spy-glass, which he finds in his pocket, and falls into a new attack of madness. Shouting "spin about, wooden doll!" he tries to throw the girl into the gulf below. His brother, brought to her side by her cries, rescues her and hastens down with her to safety. On the tower above, the madman rushes round, shrieking "Ring of fire, spin about!—" and we know the origin of the words. Among the people who begin to gather below there comes forward the figure of the lawyer Coppelius, who has suddenly returned. We may suppose that it was his approach, seen through the spy-glass, which threw
Nathaniel into his fit of madness. As the onlookers prepare to go up and overpower the madman, Coppélus laughs and says: "Wait a bit; he'll come down of himself." Nathaniel suddenly stands still, catches sight of Coppélus, and with a wild shriek "Yes! Fine eyes—fine eyes!" flings himself over the parapet. While he lies on the paving-stones with a shattered skull the Sand-Man vanishes in the throng.

This short summary leaves no doubt, I think, that the feeling of something uncanny is directly attached to the figure of the Sand-Man, that is, to the idea of being robbed of one's eyes, and that Jentsch's point of an intellectual uncertainty has nothing to do with the effect. Uncertainty whether an object is living or inanimate, which admittedly applied to the doll Olympia, is quite irrelevant in connection with this other, more striking instance of uncanniness. It is true that the writer creates a kind of uncertainty in us in the beginning by not letting us know, no doubt purposely, whether he is taking us into the real world or into a purely fantastic one of his own creation. He has, of course, a right to do either; and if he chooses to stage his action in a world peopled with spirits, demons and ghosts, as Shakespeare does in Hamlet, in Macbeth and, in a different sense, in The Tempest and A Midsummer Night's Dream, we must bow to his decision and treat his setting as though it were real for as long as we put ourselves into his hands. But this uncertainty disappears in the course of Hoffmann's story, and we perceive that he intends to make us, too, look through the demon optician's spectacles or spy-glass—perhaps, indeed, that the author in his very own person once peered through such an instrument. For the conclusion of the story makes it quite clear that Coppola the optician really is the lawyer Coppélus and also, therefore, the Sand-Man.

There is no question therefore, of any intellectual uncertainty here: we know now that we are not supposed to be looking on at the products of a madman's imagination, behind which we, with the superiority of rational minds, are able to detect the sober truth; and yet this knowledge does not lessen the impression of uncanniness in the least degree. The theory of intellectual uncertainty is thus incapable of explaining that impression.

We know from psycho-analytic experience, however, that the fear of damaging or losing one's eyes is a terrible one in children. Many adults retain their apprehensiveness in this respect, and no physical injury is so much dreaded by them as an injury to the eye. We are accustomed to say, too, that we will treasure a thing as the apple of our eye. A study of dreams, phantasies and myths has taught us that anxiety about one's eyes, the fear of going blind, is often enough a substitute for the dread of being castrated. The self-blinding of the mythical criminal, Oedipus, was simply a mitigated form of the punishment of castration—the only punishment that was adequate for him by the lex talionis. We may try on rationalistic grounds to deny that fears about the eye are derived from the fear of castration, and may argue that it is very natural that so precious an organ as the eye should be guarded by a proportionate dread. Indeed, we might go further and say that the fear of castration itself contains no other significance and no deeper secret than a justifiable dread of this rational kind. But this view does not account adequately for the substitutive relation between the eye and the male organ which is seen to exist in dreams and myths and phantasies; nor can it dispel the impression that the threat of being castrated in especial excites a peculiarly violent and obscure emotion, and that this emotion is what first gives the idea of losing other organs its intense colouring. All further doubts are removed when we learn the details of their "castration complex" from the analysis of neurotic patients, and realize its immense importance in their mental life.

Moreover, I would not recommend any opponent of the psycho-analytic view to select this particular story of the Sand-Man with which to support his argument that anxiety about the eye has nothing to do with the castration complex. For why does Hoffmann bring the anxiety about eyes into such intimate connection with the father's death? And why does the Sand-Man always appear as a disturber of love? He separates the unfortunate Nathaniel from his betrothed and from her brother, his best friend; he destroys the second object of his love, Olympia, the lovely doll; and he drives him into suicide at the moment when he has won back his Clara and is about to be happily united to her. Elements in the story like these, and many others, seem arbitrary and meaningless so long as we deny all connection between fears about the eye and castration; but they become intelligible as soon as we replace the Sand-Man by the dreaded father at whose hands castration is expected.

We shall venture, therefore, to refer the uncanny effect of the Sand-Man to the anxiety belonging to the castration complex of childhood. But having reached the idea that we can make an infantile factor such as this responsible for feelings of uncanniness, we are encouraged to see whether we can apply it to other instances of the uncanny. We find in the story of the Sand-Man the other theme on which Jentsch lays stress, of a doll which appears to be alive. Jentsch believes that a particularly favourable condition for awakening uncanny feelings is created when there is intellectual uncertainty whether an object is alive or not, and when an inanimate object becomes too much like an animate one. Now, dolls are of course rather closely connected with childhood life. We remember that in their early games children do not distinguish at all sharply between living and inanimate objects, and that they are especially fond of treating their dolls like live people. In fact, I have occasionally heard a woman patient declare that even at the age of eight she had still been convinced that her dolls would be certain to come to life if she were to look at them in a particular, extremely concentrated, way. So that here, too, it is not difficult to discover a factor from childhood. But, curiously enough, while the Sand-Man story deals with the arousing of an early childhood fear, the idea of a "living doll" excites no fear at all; children have no fear of their dolls coming to life, they may even desire it. The source of uncanny feelings would not, therefore, be an infantile fear in this case, but rather an infantile wish or even merely an infantile belief. There seems to be a contradiction here; but perhaps it is only a complication, which may be helpful to us later on.

Hoffmann is in literature the unrivalled master of conjuring up the uncanny. His Elixir des Teufels [The Devil's Elixir] contains a mass of themes to which one is tempted to ascribe the uncanny effect of the narrative; but it is too obscure and intricate a story to venture to summarize. Towards the end of the book the reader
is told the facts, hitherto concealed from him, from which the action springs; with
the result, not that he is at last enlightened, but that he falls into a state of complete
bewilderment. The author has piled up too much of a kind; one's comprehension
of the whole suffers as a result, though not the impression it makes. We must
content ourselves with selecting those themes of uncanniness which are most
prominent, and seeing whether we can fairly trace them also back to infantile
sources. These themes are all concerned with the idea of a "double" in every shape
and degree, with persons, therefore, who are to be considered identical by reason
of looking alike; Hoffmann accentuates this relation by transferring mental
processes from the one person to the other — what we should call telepathy — so
that the one possesses knowledge, feeling and experience in common with the other,
identifies himself with another person, so that his self becomes confounded, or the
foreign self is substituted for his own — in other words, by doubling, dividing and
interchanging the self. And finally there is the constant recurrence of similar
situations, a same face, or character-trait, or twist of fortune, or a same crime, or
even a same name recurring throughout several consecutive generations.

The theme of the "double" has been very thoroughly treated by Otto Rank.7 He
goes into the connections the "double" has with reflections in mirrors; with
shadows, guardian spirits, with the belief in the soul and the fear of death; but he
also lets in a flood of light on the astonishing evolution of this idea. For the "double"
was originally an insurance against destruction to the ego, an "energetic denial of
the power of death," as Rank says; and probably the "Immortal" soul was the first
double of the body. This invention of doubling as a preservation against
extinction has its counterpart in the language of dreams, which is fond of
representing castration by a doubling or multiplication of the genital symbol; the
same desire spurred on the ancient Egyptians to the art of making images of the
dead in some lasting material. Such ideas, however, have sprung from the soil of
unbounded self-love, from the primary narcissism which holds sway in the mind
of the child as in that of primitive man; and when this stage has been left behind
the double takes on a different aspect. From having been an assurance of
death, it becomes the ghastly harbinger of death.

The idea of the "double" does not necessarily disappear with the passing of the
primary narcissism, for it can receive fresh meaning from the later stages of
development of the ego. A special faculty is slowly formed there, able to oppose
the rest of the ego, with the function of observing and criticizing the self and
exercising a censorship within the mind, and this we become aware of as our
"conscience." In the pathological case of delusions of being watched this mental
institute becomes isolated, dissociated from the ego, and discernible to a
physician's eye. The fact that a faculty of this kind exists, which is able to treat
the rest of the ego like an object — the fact, that is, that man is capable of self-observation
— renders it possible to invest the old idea of a "double" with a new meaning and
to ascribe many things to it, above all, those things which seem to the new faculty
of self-criticism to belong to the old surmounted narcissism of the earliest period
of all.

But it is not only this narcissism, offensive to the ego-criticizing faculty, which
may be incorporated in the idea of a double. There are also all those unfilled but
possible futures to which we still like to cling in phantasy, all those strivings of the
ego which adverse external circumstances have crushed, and all our suppressed acts
of volition which nourish in us the illusion of Free Will.8

But, after having thus considered the manifest motivation of the figure of a
"double," we have to admit that none of it helps us to understand the extraordinarily
strong feeling of something uncanny that pervades the conception; and our
knowledge of pathological mental processes enables us to add that nothing in the
content arrived at could account for that impulse towards self-protection which has
caused the ego to project such a content outward as something foreign to itself. The
quality of uncanniness can only come from the circumstance of the "double" being
a creation dating back to a very early mental stage — long since left behind, and one,
no doubt, in which it wore a more friendly aspect. The "double" has become a vision
of terror, just as after the fall of their religion the gods took on daemonic shapes.9
It is not difficult to judge, on the same lines as his theme of the "double," the
other forms of disturbance in the ego made use of by Hoffmann. They are a harking
back to particular phases in the evolution of the self-regarding feeling; a regression
to a time when the ego was not yet sharply differentiated from the external world
and from other persons. I believe that these factors are partly responsible for the
impression of the uncanny, although it is not easy to isolate and determine exactly
their share of it.

That factor which consists in a recurrence of the same situations, things and
events, will perhaps not appeal to everyone as a source of uncanny feeling. From
what I have observed, this phenomenon does undoubtedly, subject to certain
conditions and combined with certain circumstances, awaken an uncanny feeling,
which recalls that sense of helplessness sometimes experienced in dreams. Once,
as I was walking through the deserted streets of a provincial town in Italy which
was strange to me, on a hot summer afternoon, I found myself in a quarter the
character of which could not long remain in doubt. Nothing but painted women
were to be seen at the windows of the small houses, and I hastened to leave the
narrow street at the next turning. But after having wandered about for a while
without being directed, I suddenly found myself back in the same street, where my
presence was now beginning to excite attention. I hurried away once more, but only
to arrive yet a third time by devious paths in the same place. Now, however, a feeling
overcame me which I can only describe as uncanny, and I was glad enough to
abandon my exploratory walk and get straight back to the piazza I had left a short
while before. Other situations having in common with my adventure an involuntary
return to the same situation, but which differ radically from it in other respects,
also result in the same feeling of helplessness and of something uncanny. As, for
instance, when one is lost in a forest in high altitudes, caught, we will suppose, by
the mountain mist, and when every endeavour to find the marked or familiar path
ends again and again in a return to one and the same spot, recognizable by some
particular landmark. Or when one wanders about in a dark, strange room looking
for the door or the electric switch, and collides for the hundredth time with the same piece of furniture—a situation which, indeed, has been made irresistibly comic by Mark Twain, through the wild extravagance of his narration.

Taking another class of things, it is easy to see that here, too, it is only this factor of involuntary repetition which surrounds with an uncanny atmosphere what would otherwise be innocent enough, and forces upon us the idea of something fateful and unescapable where otherwise we should have spoken of "chance" only. For instance, we of course attach no importance to the event when we give up a coat and get a cloakroom ticket with the number, say, 62; or when we find that our cabin on board ship is numbered 62. But the impression is altered if two such events, each in itself indifferent, happen close together, if we come across the number 62 several times in a single day, or if we begin to notice that everything which has a number—addresses, hotel-rooms, compartments in railway-trains—always has the same one, or one which at least contains the same figures.

We do feel this to be "uncanny," and unless a man is utterly hardened and proof against the lure of superstition he will be tempted to ascribe a secret meaning to this obstinate recurrence of a number, taking it, perhaps, as an indication of the span of life allotted to him. Or take the case that one is engaged at the time in reading the works of Hering, the famous physiologist, and then receives within the space of a few days two letters from two different countries, each from a person called Hering; whereas one has never before had any dealings with anyone of that name. Not long ago an ingenious scientist attempted to reduce coincidences of this kind to certain laws, and so deprive them of their uncanny effect. I will not venture to decide whether he has succeeded or not.

How exactly we can trace back the uncanny effect of such recurrent similarities to infantile psychology is a question I can only lightly touch upon in these pages, and I must refer the reader instead to another pamphlet now ready for publication, in which this has been gone into in detail, but in a different connection. It must be explained that we are able to postulate the principle of a repetition-compulsion in the unconscious mind, based upon instinctual activity and probably inherent in the very nature of the instincts—a principle powerful enough to overrule the pleasure principle, lending to certain aspects of the mind their demonic character, and still very clearly expressed in the tendencies of small children; a principle, too, which is responsible for a part of the course taken by the analyses of neurotic patients. Taken in all, the foregoing prepares us for the discovery that whatever reminds us of this inner repetition-compulsion is perceived as uncanny.

Now, however, it is time to turn from these aspects of the matter, which are in any case difficult to decide upon, and look for undeniable instances of the uncanny, in the hope that analysis of them will settle whether our hypothesis is a valid one.

In the story of "The Ring of Polycrates," the guest turns away from his friend with horror because he sees that his every wish is at once fulfilled, his every care immediately removed by kindly fate. His host has become "uncanny" to him. His own explanation, that the too fortunate man has to fear the envy of the gods, seems still rather obscure to us; its meaning is veiled in mythological language. We will therefore turn to another example in a less grandiose setting. In the case history of an obsessional neurotic, I have described how the patient once stayed in a hydrophobic establishment and benefited greatly by it. He had the good sense, however, to attribute his improvement not to the therapeutic properties of the water, but to the situation of his room, which immediately adjoined that of a very amiable nurse. So on his second visit to the establishment he asked for the same room but was told that it was already occupied by an old gentleman, whereupon he gave vent to his annoyance in the words, "Well, I hope he'll have a stroke and die." A fortnight later the old gentleman really did have a stroke. My patient thought this an "uncanny" experience. And that impression of uncanniness would have been stronger still if less time had elapsed between his exclamation and the untoward event, or if he had been able to produce innumerable similar coincidences.

As a matter of fact, he had no difficulty in producing coincidences of this sort, but then not only he but all obsessional neurotics I have observed are able to relate analogous experiences. They are never surprised when they invariably run up against the person they have just been thinking of, perhaps for the first time for many months. If they say one day "I haven't had news of so-and-so for a long time," they will be sure to get a letter from him the next morning. And an accident or a death will rarely take place without having cast its shadow before on their minds. They are in the habit of mentioning this state of affairs in the most modest manner, saying that they have "presentiments" which "usually" come true.

One of the most uncanny and wide-spread forms of superstition is the dread of the evil eye. There never seems to have been any doubt about the source of this dread. Whoever possesses something at once valuable and fragile is afraid of the envy of others, in that he projects on to them the envy he would have felt in their place. A feeling like this betrays itself in a look even though it is not put into words; and when a man attracts the attention of others by noticeable, and particularly by unattractive, attributes, they are ready to believe that his envy is rising to more than usual heights and that this intensity in it will convert it into effective action. What is feared is thus a secret intention of harming someone, and certain signs are taken to mean that such an intention is capable of becoming an act.

These last examples of the uncanny are to be referred to that principle in the mind which I have called "omnipotence of thoughts," taking the name from an expression used by one of my patients. And now we find ourselves on well-known ground: Our analysis of instances of the uncanny has led us back to the old, animistic conception of the universe which was characterized by the idea that the world was peopled with the spirits of humane narcissistic overestimation of subjective mental processes (such as the belief in the omnipotence of thoughts, the magical practices based upon this belief, the carefully proportioned distribution of magical powers or "mana" among various outside persons and things), as well as by all those other figments of the imagination with which man, in the unrestricted narcissism of that stage of development, strove to withstand the inexorable laws of reality. It would seem as though each one of us has been through a phase of individual development corresponding to that animistic stage in primitive men, that
none of us has traversed it without preserving certain traces of it which can be reactivated and that everything which now strikes us as "uncanny" fulfills the condition of stirring these vestiges of animistic mental activity within us and bringing them to expression.11

At this point I will put forward two considerations which, I think, contain the gist of this short study. In the first place, if psycho-analytic theory is correct in maintaining that every emotional affect, whatever its quality, is transformed by the process of repression into morbid anxiety, then among such cases of anxiety there must be a class in which the anxiety can be shown to come from something repressed which recurred. This class of morbid anxiety would then be no other than what is uncanny, irrespective of whether it originally aroused dread or some other affect. In the second place, if this is indeed the secret nature of the uncanny, we can understand why the usage of speech has extended *das Heimische* into its opposite *das Unheimliche*;12 for this uncanny is in reality nothing new or foreign, but something familiar and old—established in the mind that has been estranged only by the process of repression. This reference to the factor of repression enables us, furthermore, to understand Schelling's definition of the uncanny as something which ought to have been kept concealed but which has nevertheless come to light.

**Notes**

1 [Throughout this paper "uncanny" is used as the English translation of "unheimlich," literally "unhomely."—Trans.]

2 [From Haus = house; Hauslichkeit = domestic life. — Trans.]


4 Frau Dr. Rank has pointed out the association of the name with "*coppella*" = crucible, connecting it with the chemical operations that caused the father's death; and also with "*oppo*" = eye-socket. [Except in the first (1919) edition this footnote was attached, it seems erroneously, to the first occurrence of the name Coppelius on this page.]

5 In fact, Hoffmann's imaginative treatment of his material has not made such wild confusion of its elements that we cannot reconstruct their original arrangement. In the story of Nathaniel's childhood, the figures of his father and Coppelius represent the two opposites into which the father-imago is split by his ambivalence; whereas the one threatens to blind him—that is, to castrate him—the other, the "good" father, intercedes for his sight. The part of the complex which is most strongly repressed, the death-wish against the "bad" father, finds expression in the death of the "good" father, and Coppelius is made answerable for it. This pair of fathers is represented later, in his student days, by Professor Spalanzani and Coppola the optician. The Professor is in himself a member of the father-series, and Coppola is recognized as identical with Coppelius the lawyer. Just as they used before to work together over the secret brazier, so now they have jointly created the doll Olympia; the Professor is even called the father of Olympia. This double occurrence of activity in common betrays them as divisions of the father-imago: both the mechanician and the optician were the father of Nathaniel (and of Olympia as well). In the frightening scene in childhood, Coppelius, after sparing Nathaniel's eyes, had screwed off his arms and legs as an experiment; that is, he had worked on him as a mechanician would on a doll. This singular feature, which seems quite outside the picture of the Sand-Man, introduces a new castration equivalent, but it also points to the inner identity of Coppelius with his later counterpart, Spalanzani the mechanician, and prepares us for the interpretation of Olympia. This automatic doll can be nothing else than a materialization of Nathaniel's feminine attitude towards his father in his infancy. Her fathers, Spalanzani and Coppola, are, after all, nothing but new editions, reincarnations of Nathaniel's pair of fathers. Spalanzani's otherwise incomprehensible statement that the optician has stolen Nathaniel's eyes . . . so as to set them in the doll, now becomes significant as supplying evidence of the identity of Olympia and Nathaniel. Olympia is, as it were, a dissociated complex of Nathaniel's which confronts him as a person, and Nathaniel's enslavement to this complex is expressed in his senseless obsessive love for Olympia. We may with justice call love of this kind narcissistic, and we can understand why someone who has fallen victim to it should relinquish the real, external object of his love. The psychological truth of the situation in which the young man, fixated upon his father by his castration complex, becomes incapable of loving a woman, is amply proved by numerous analyses of patients whose story, though less fantastic, is hardly less tragic than that of the student Nathaniel.

Hoffmann was the child of an unhappy marriage. When he was three years old, his father left his small family, and was never united to them again. According to Grisebach, in his biographical introduction to Hoffmann's works, the writer's relation to his father was always a most sensitive subject with him.

6 "Der Doppelgänger."

7 I cannot help thinking that when poets complain that two souls dwell within the human breast, and when popular psychologists talk of the splitting of the ego in an individual, they have some notion of this division (which relates to the sphere of ego-psychology) between the critical faculty and the rest of the ego, and not of the antithesis discovered by psycho-analysis between the ego and what is unconscious and repressed. It is true that the distinction is to some extent effaced by the circumstance that derivatives of what is repressed are foremost among the things reprehended by the ego-criticizing.

8 In Ewers' *Der Student von Prag*, which furnishes the starting-point of Rank's study on the "double," the hero has promised his beloved not to kill his antagonist in a duel. But on his way to the dueling-ground he meets his "double," who has already killed his rival.

9 Heine, *Die Götter im Exil*.

10 P. Kammere, *Das Gesetz der Serie*. [Beyond the Pleasure Principle. — Trans.]

11 Freud, "Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis," *Collected Papers*, vol. iii.

12 Seligmann, the Hamburg ophthalmologist, has made a thorough study of this superstition in his *Der bise Blick und Verirrungen*.

13 Cf. my book *Totem and Tabu*, part iii, "Animismus Magie und Allmacht der Gedanken"; also the footnote on p. 7 of the same book. "It would appear that we invest with a feeling of uncanniness those impressions which lend support to a belief in the omnipotence of thoughts and to the animistic attitude of mind at a time when our judgement has already rejected these same beliefs."

14 Cf. abstract on pp. 155-6.